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ROUND TABLE

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A Radio Discussion by

- ROBERT LAMB
- LOUIS WIRTH
- LEO WOLMAN

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NOVEMBER 1, 1942

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ROUND TABLE

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NOTE

The supplementary information contained in the footnotes to the following text, developed by staff research, is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the ROUND TABLE *speakers. Following the transcript of the broadcast are questions which readers may wish to use for analysis and discussion. It is hoped that teachers and discussion leaders may find this additional service of the* ROUND TABLE *transcript helpful in their study of the subject discussed in the broadcast.*

MANPOWER

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST*

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ROBERT K. LAMB, Staff Director of the Tolan Committee

LOUIS WIRTH, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago

LEO WOLMAN, Department of Economics, Columbia University

* A radio discussion broadcast from Washington, D.C., over stations of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, November 1, 1942, at 2:30 P.M., Eastern War Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script, although participants meet in advance, prepare a topical outline, and exchange data and views. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

MANPOWER

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The long-anticipated crisis in manpower is at hand! Uncle Sam faces, for the first time in history, a shortage of manpower! War Manpower Commission Chairman Paul V. McNutt has recently designated over sixty areas in the United States where general labor shortage already exists. Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard has warned the nation that we face a general food shortage unless prompt action is taken on the farm-labor question. The Tolan Committee of the House of Representatives recently declared that this war can be lost in Washington.

What can be done to avert these threats to the success of the war effort? Where does the responsibility lie? What effective means can be employed to solve the manpower problem? The current demand for the immediate passage of a national manpower service act is said to be a symptom of prevailing administrative shortcomings which must be faced quickly and corrected in order to prevent disaster.

To discuss "Manpower" and its relation to our war effort, the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE *opened its microphones to three expert observers.*

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MR. WIRTH: Next to what's happening on the battle fronts, the most important issue before the country today is the question of manpower.

MR. WOLMAN: Before going into the details of the discussion of this question of manpower, it's important to point out that the manpower problem is not limited to that of supplying the armed services with the necessary number of people they need, but it also involves supplying industry and the transportation of this country

with an adequate working force. Further, the manpower problem is not a separate and independent problem but is part of the general problem of war organization.

MR. LAMB: On that point isn't it true that it is a problem of the entire economy what happens to our use of manpower?

MR. WIRTH: Let's inquire what the structure is of our total war effort.

MR. WOLMAN: If one looks at the structure of the total war effort in this country today, he gets a picture of great confusion and of lack of integration.

Enumerated very briefly, the important and principal components of this structure follow. There stands at the top the Commander-in-Chief with almost unlimited powers. Under him are the general staffs of the armed services. Then the Service of Supply, which directs the distribution of military supplies and supplies to the civilian population. In this group finally come the two agencies appointed at different times that have to do with the distribution of the country's manpower—the Selective Service System and the War Manpower Commission.[1]

MR. WIRTH: As things now stand it seems to me that, while each one of these agencies and personalities may be very efficient as a whole, they do not as yet make up an efficient war machine.

MR. LAMB: That's right. The situation as described a moment ago would suggest that this was a neat and orderly structure. As

[1] The War Manpower Commission as originally set up includes the following agencies: (1) Selective Service, with respect to use and classification of needed agricultural, industrial, and government workers; (2) Federal Security Agency, with respect to employment service and defense training; (3)WPA, with respect to placement and training; (4) Railroad Board, with respect to employment; (5) United States Civil Service Commission, with respect to government job-filling; (6) Bureau of Labor Statistics; (7) Labor Production Division of WPB; (8) Civilian Conservation Corps; (9) Department of Agriculture, with respect to labor market activities; and (10) Office of Defense Transportation, with respect to labor supply requirements.

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a matter of fact, there are today separate machines in these agencies working in competition with one another. These competing agencies have many jurisdictional disputes. There is to date no assembly line along which move the decisions on our war program.[2]

MR. WIRTH: If that's so, let's examine the evidence.

MR. WOLMAN: It would be proper at this point to quote a statement from the Tolan Committee—the congressional committee which has been investigating this war effort for a number of months.

MR. WIRTH: I want to say that this has been one of the best committees that Congress has had in recent years.

MR. WOLMAN: I agree with that. Referring to the War Production Board, which everyone had considered to be an agency appointed to centralize our war efforts, the Tolan Committee said that that board has acted as an arbitrator of conflicting demands and not as an executive scheduling production.[3]

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[2] "If manpower mobilization is to be effectively carried out for industry, agriculture, and the armed forces, some agency of central authority above existing agencies must determine the numbers of the armed forces, allocate manpower between competing demands of the armed services and the war economy, relate production to military strategy, and make similar basic decisions. The War Manpower Commission cannot expect to secure final authority for such decisions, which require joint determination. At present, however, as Governor McNutt, General Hershey, and Mr. Nelson all testified, these decisions are falling between several agencies and hence are being made only negatively and by default. They should be arrived at by some joint war production control board and must precede the effective organization of operations by these agencies . . . ." (House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration [Tolan Committee], *Changes Needed for Effective Mobilization of Manpower* [Washington, D.C., October 20, 1942]).

[3] "The present dispersal of responsibility for production has been actively promoted by the War Production Board. Instead of integrating and coordinating individual projects as part of a national war production program, the War Production Board has assumed the role of umpire between the competitors for essential factors of production. . . . . We cannot expect to organize war production by using umpires any more than we can expect to operate a railroad system with umpires instead of schedules.

"The staffing of the War Production Board with corporation executives,

MR. WIRTH: Isn't it a fact that up until recently we didn't even know how many men we were going to have in the armed forces themselves? Major Seversky wrote, a while ago, "The fact that a thirteen-million figure for the Army did not evoke even a gasp of consternation is proof enough that we are succumbing to the anaesthesia of numbers. 'Million' has become a digit in our thinking. . . . ."[4]

MR. WOLMAN: Even a more striking illustration of that is the great variety of estimates current in this country that have undertaken to determine what the ratio of the number of civilian producers is to the number of people in the armed services. This ratio at one time was stated to be eighteen to one. In late weeks it has been reduced to five to one. Which of these two extreme figures is correct no one knows, and no one knows also on which of these two figures our organizations work.

MR. LAMB: When Commissioner McNutt, Selective Service Director Hershey, and War Production Chief Nelson testified before the Tolan Committee, they all admitted that they didn't know who was determining the allocation of manpower for military and industrial requirements.

MR. WIRTH: If the situation is as you have described it, gentlemen, then there can be only one set of consequences: First, that our war effort will be wasteful—that actually we may prolong the war thereby—and, second, that the people's confidence in the conduct of the war may be undermined.

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bankers, and other individuals experienced in business maneuvers is a direct consequence of the umpire approach to war production. The type of personnel employed is prima facie evidence that the War Production Board has never been converted to the job of war production. The committee cannot understand why the persons charged by the Commander in Chief with the responsibility of creating the arsenal of democracy do not bring into their service the best production men directly from the plants instead of borrowing sales managers and corporations executives . . . ." (*ibid.*).

[4] See Major Alexander P. De Seversky's article, "Is Our Army Too Large?" *American Mercury*, November, 1942.

LABOR RESOURCES—AXIS *vs.* UNITED NATIONS*


UNITED NATIONS
OCCUPIED BY GERMANS
GERMAN DOMINATED
OCCUPIED BY JAPANESE
NEUTRAL
NUMBER WITH GAINFUL OCCUPATIONS
COUNTRIES OCCUPIED BY GERMAN ARMED FORCES
EACH SYMBOL EQUALS 10 MILLION WORKERS
COUNTRIES UNDER GERMAN DOMINATION
TOTAL OF ABOVE PLUS GERMANY AND JAPAN
UNITED NATIONS
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUNDTABLE PICTOGRAPH BY H. HAYDON

* Countries occupied by German armed forces include all of France but not Russia; countries under German domination include Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, Italy; and, under the Nazi sphere, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. The United Nations include the United States, Russia, Great Britain and its Dominions, Ireland, Egypt, Palestine, Mexico, Cuba, Brazil. However, India and China are *not* included because of the lack of dependable data (International Labour Office, *Yearbook, 1941*, quoted in the June, 1942, *Monthly Labor Review*).

MR. LAMB: The situation is at least as you have described it. Not only is our confidence undermined but throughout the country at the present time we can see evidence that the people are dis-

turbed. That evidence is perfectly mirrored in the mail which comes to Washington, to the desks of congressmen.

MR. WOLMAN: Evidently the difficulty is not a lack of authority, because our agencies have a great deal of authority, nor is it a lack of support from the general population of this country, which is apparently willing to give the authorities in Washington and the war administration all the assistance they need.[5]

MR. WIRTH: Having inquired into the symptoms of the situation, I think we ought next to inquire into another aspect of it.

A second area of interest in today's ROUND TABLE has been suggested by several listeners in their letters. Let us have their questions read.

ANNOUNCER: *What are the factors responsible for the manpower muddle? The Gallup Poll says that the American public, judging by tests of opinion, is willing to go the whole way in a manpower conscription program. If the people aren't at fault, who is? The Tolan Committee says that this country is still waging war according to the pat-*

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[5] "The Executive order creating the Commission instructed the Chairman, after consultation with members of the Commission, to 'formulate plans and programs and establish basic national policies to assure the most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war.' After 6 months of existence the War Manpower Commission has hardly begun to assess its responsibilities. Existing agencies were rejuggled and particular programs transferred from one agency to another. Numerous directives were issued to agencies, instructing some to do what they already were doing, instructing others to undertake activities impossible with their limited appropriations. The authority behind each directive was never clearly stipulated, and its interpretation rested with the particular agency.

"The need for a centralized authority to mobilize manpower becomes more evident every day as chaos increases in this field. The War Manpower Commission now seeks a national service act to underwrite the authority it has failed to exercise, and to give the semblance of necessary centralization. The Selective Service System, already entrenched in one part of the field, seeks by the same means to broaden and extend its control. But the onrush of events has now made Selective Service obsolete as the administrative mechanism for total mobilization of manpower while the War Manpower Commission has not begun to do the job" (House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, *op. cit.*).

terns of World War I, while our enemies have spent ten years in preparation for World War II. Do you agree?

MR. WIRTH: I think I ought to say that we're not accusing any individuals. We're assuming that all of our responsible officials in Washington, from the President down, want to win this war and want to win it as fast and as economically as possible.

MR. LAMB: But we are assuming that those in authority have to date demonstrated no plan according to which they are proposing to organize the country or to win the war on the production front.

MR. WIRTH: Isn't it natural that we as a peace-loving people that have been watching for years the world go by, so to speak, as if it weren't a part of us should be slow in getting organized for war?

MR. LAMB: Yes, but, on the other hand, that is no excuse, in view of the fact that our enemies have had ten years of preparation which we have watched and could have studied, for not improvising before this time a more adequate plan.

MR. WIRTH: Let me cite to you the experiences of the last war, as they were stated by Newton D. Baker, then Secretary of War. He said: "I delight in the fact that when we entered the war we were not like our adversary ready for it, anxious for it, prepared for it, and inviting it. Accustomed to peace, we were not ready."

At a later time he testified: "When we began the actual mobilization of material for our participation in the World War, there were simply no American munitions makers. . . . . The British and French supplied us with cannon out of their surpluses in exchange for raw materials. . . . . We bought in Canada a very large supply of Ross rifles, an obsolete arm, and used leftovers of the Spanish war, but still gave some of our recruits initial training with broomsticks. . . . . We bought revolvers and pistols of every sort and ransacked the museums of the city police departments for confiscated 'concealed weapons,' but at the end of the War, we were still short of the required supply."[6]

[6] Quoted by H. M. Kallen, "The War and Education in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLVIII, No. 3 (November, 1942), 331, n. 2.

MR. WOLMAN: There's another feature of this war which seems to me to be peculiar to it. It is that before we entered this war we had, for ten years, a very large and continuing volume of unemployment in this country. To deal with it, we had created an elaborate system of unemployment agencies. These agencies and the psychology of unemployment we carried over into the war period when our conditions of employment had radically changed.

MR. WIRTH: Moreover, as far as agriculture is concerned, we've been used to agricultural surpluses, and now Secretary Wickard tells us we may have shortages.

MR. LAMB: In other words, we must realize that a war economy is a shortage economy.

MR. WIRTH: It doesn't need to be if our productive power is great enough to supply the men in the Army and in the field and the civilians at home.

It seems to me the question fundamentally is that somebody somewhere has responsibility which he is not using. Somebody has power which he is not using. Whenever we get a combination of more responsibility than power, we get paralysis. Whenever we get more power than responsibility, we probably get some kind of absolutism.

MR. LAMB: As far as absolutism is concerned, we have immediately to recognize that in the course of this war compulsion of some kind may be necessary but that an organization must precede in a country of democracy any measure of compulsion. At least that's my point of view.[7]

[7] "This committee is not opposed to compulsion as such. Our stand in favor of postponing national service legislation is based upon our view that the creation of adequate machinery for manpower mobilization must precede the passage of such an act. The evidence taken by this committee indicates that adequate machinery does not now exist..... First, the absence of any central authority for relating the rate at which the armed forces shall be increased to the demands for manpower in war production. Second, the absence of any regional and local machinery for providing an inventory of requirements of war industry and transportation. Third, the absence of any regional and local machinery for meeting manpower demand with an adequate supply through a program for transfer, training, and upgrading." (House Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, *op. cit.*)

Mr. Wolman: Whatever position we take about compulsion at this time, it's perfectly clear that we lack an understanding of the requisite organization and the requisite facts.

Mr. Wirth: Those are two separate things. We need the facts, and we need an appropriate organization. Let's examine the organization first.

Mr. Lamb: Let me give you an illustration which I think shows a decided lack of organization.

In this country, recently, there were two steel companies which shall be nameless. One of these steel companies asked for thirty-nine million dollars to build a new plant. The other asked for fifteen million dollars to convert its existing plant. The plants would have the same capacity.

The fifteen-million-dollar plant was converted but only after six months' delay and fighting to get the money. The other plant began to be built almost immediately after the request. Today, however, the fifteen-million-dollar plant, after only sixty days for conversion, has been in operation for months. The newly built plant, costing thirty-nine million, will not be in operation until March, 1943.

Mr. Wolman: Another illustration is the simultaneous existence in this country of areas of considerable labor shortage and areas of very great and continuing unemployment. An agency of the War Manpower Commission itself reported only a couple of months ago that there were already sixty-six areas in this country in which there was a general labor shortage and that this number might be expected progressively to increase. We face that situation, while at the same time we have considerable industrial areas in which there is a surplus of employment and a large volume of unemployment.

Mr. Wirth: Are you, as a New Yorker, by any chance suggesting that New York isn't getting its proper quota of war contracts?

Mr. Wolman: I certainly am referring to New York. By re-

* From 1940 Census bulletin. Study by Brigadier General Frederick H. Osborn, chief of special service, and J. C. Capt, director of the Bureau of the Census.

ferring to New York, I should suggest, also, that no canvass has been made of the labor supply of that city in order to determine how effectively the unused labor resources of that great industrial area could be employed for the war effort.

MR. LAMB: I would like to suggest that both Wolman's example and mine are a demonstration of the failure to organize in advance and to fit these individual cases into a national pattern.

MR. WIRTH: Let me quote from the report of the Tolan Committee. In stressing the need for a centralized planning of war mobilization, the committee cited the testimony of Manpower Commissioner Paul V. McNutt, Selective Service Director Louis B. Hershey, and War Production Board Chief Donald Nelson, all of whom admitted that they didn't know who was determining the allocation of manpower for military and industrial requirements.

MR. WOLMAN: Not only is there this lack of organization but there is a lack of basic facts on which any adequate organization can be erected. For example, we don't know what the total work force of this country is at the present time. Estimates by accredited agencies differ by as much as five million, running from fifty-seven to sixty-two millions.

MR. WIRTH: Wait a minute! Didn't I fill out a questionnaire that was sent to all men under sixty-five years of age that asked me what I could do?

Mr. Wolman: So did I.

Mr. Wirth: What's become of that?

Mr. Wolman: I don't know what's become of these questionnaires.

Mr. Lamb: You did fill out such questionnaires, but only an amazingly small percentage of these have yet been tabulated, according to recent testimony before a congressional committee.

Mr. Wirth: If they were tabulated today, would they show us what the situation is as of, let's say, November 1, 1942?

Mr. Lamb: No, they would not. Of course, too, they apply only to a very limited part of the population—the male population which has not yet been taken into the armed forces. They do not cover women.

Mr. Wirth: You mean to say we don't know what potential woman force we have?

Mr. Lamb: No. The President has recently suggested that he thinks the time has come for such a questionnaire to be filed. Let us hope that that questionnaire doesn't have the fate of the first. Both must be compiled together.

Mr. Wirth: I note in the Tolan Committee report that there is also an interesting statement on materials claiming that the War Production Board was asked what became of the four hundred million pounds of copper that presumably were available. Only one hundred millions pounds of these four hundred million pounds were really spotted. What has become of the other three hundred million pounds?

Mr. Lamb: Donald Nelson testified that they didn't know. He thought that it was unfortunate, and he said that they were trying to find them. Thirty million pounds had already been redistributed, but the remaining seventy out of the first hundred had not.

Mr. Wirth: We have, then, the question of manpower and we have the question of materials.



* From *Monthly Labor Review*, September, 1942, and *Business Week*, October 10, 1942. From WPA Monthly Sample Study.

How about the question of structure for conversion purposes? I note that the Tolan Committee report says that there is not today available within the federal government any single agency which knows whether conversion has taken place at 30 per cent or at 50 per cent of efficiency.[8]

MR. WOLMAN: Nor is there any information at what rate of capacity our industry is now operating, whether it's operating at 50 per cent or something greatly or slightly in excess of that percentage.

MR. WIRTH: We have described so far what the actual situation is. Let's hear the second question of the ROUND TABLE listeners.

ANNOUNCER: *What are the guiding principles upon which an intelligent manpower program ought to be based? Several listeners have*

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[8] "The conversion of American industry has been widely publicized. The findings of this committee show that in the absence of any detailed production program directed by a single agency, maximum conversion of America's great peacetime resources to war production has never been achieved. The degree of conversion has been largely at the discretion of the individual manufacturer.

"There is not today available within the Federal Government any single agency which knows whether conversion has taken place at 30 per cent or at 50 per cent efficiency" (*ibid.*).

quoted Walter Lippmann, who says: "We can be quite sure that we shall never ration manpower effectively, that we shall not 'have the right numbers of the right people in the right places at the right time' unless we start by finding the right men with the right authority right away." Do you agree with Mr. Lippmann? If so, what specific suggestions do you advance?

MR. WIRTH: I for one feel very humble in the face of that question as to what we ought to do about this complicated and serious problem. I feel that I ought to ask myself, "Who am I to discuss such a question as that, since I'm not a general or a production manager?"

MR. WOLMAN: It is true that there are great pools of information, secret, confidential, which are not accessible to us. Nevertheless, we act as citizens. We have the citizen's interest in these problems.

MR. LAMB: I object to this humility in the face of this problem. The facts so far demonstrate that the so-called "experts" and the authorities and administrators have not yet worked out the problem. I see no reason why we should not undertake to discuss it.

MR. WIRTH: It's simply this. I don't want to be a "typewriter strategist," but the fact is that it seems to me that there are certain policies to be formed. In our democracy policies are formed by the electorate, by the people generally. It's on the policies that I think we ought to take up this issue, not on the methods of implementing that policy.

MR. WOLMAN: Exactly. We're not engaged in attempting to work out the details of a new structure of administration or of organization. We are trying to find out what the facts are, how these facts can be most readily attained, and how they can then be converted into the most effective type of machinery.

MR. LAMB: We have already agreed that the primary fact is that manpower is only a part of the larger problem and that we



* Estimated employment of factory wage-earners, April, 1942. From *Monthly Labor Review*, September, 1942.

must organize both manpower and the production program around certain central principles.

MR. WOLMAN: We have also agreed that the basic facts with respect to our requirements of manpower in the total and in detail are not now available to this country.

MR. WIRTH: Mr. Wolman, with you as an academic man, talking to me as another academic man, I feel that maybe our listeners feel that we're going to suggest the universal remedy of academic men—namely, let's have another survey; let's have some more research. I think we're in a war, and the question is not where we're going to do some more research but what we can do with the facts that are accessible to us.

MR. WOLMAN: What we want is not research but an investigation and the gathering-together of the great volumes of data which are now available in separate, independent, and competing agencies, and the use of these data to develop a program. We know there have been very many occasions in which investigations of that sort, which one can call "research" if one wishes to, have had successful conclusions.

MR. WIRTH: Are you suggesting that we have something like the Baruch Committee on the rubber situation?

MR. WOLMAN: I think we've now reached the stage in the manpower problem and the problem of war organization where we ought to utilize a commission of that type.

MR. LAMB: I don't quite agree. In my estimation manpower is not a problem like rubber. It involves every man and woman and youth in the United States, and, consequently, it is a problem in which either a conference representing all the people should be called together by the President of the United States, so that organized representatives could appear in Washington and settle this question, or else the question should be threshed out before a joint congressional committee of the House and Senate.

MR. WOLMAN: I don't object to conferences, and I don't object to lengthy, prolonged congressional hearings, but this manpower problem and the problem of concentrated authority to run the war effort seem to me so pressing that we should, before doing anything else, take this step to gather adequate information and to get a plan.

MR. LAMB: I'm not arguing for a prolongation of this. I believe that we could settle the major outlines of this problem before the first of January, 1943.

MR. WIRTH: I think we're all agreed that we ought not to argue the question as to whether there ought to be a lengthy investigation. On the other hand, we're also agreed that we don't want to be blind and hysterical. But there are certain facts that we already know about this situation, and one thing we can certainly say is that something can be done about the labor situation.

MR. WOLMAN: We've known for a long time, for example, that there are large numbers of inadequately trained people in this country that ought to be retrained and ought to be graded up, but we've done very little about it.

MR. WIRTH: Yes. There are large numbers of Negroes and other minorities and large numbers of women that could be brought into war industry.

SKILLED WORKERS NEEDED*

* In war-manufacturing industries the percentage of skilled and semiskilled workers needed for efficient production is relatively high. In most munitions industries the above relative proportions have been estimated as necessary (Office of Emergency Management, *War Facts*).

Mr. Wolman: We haven't yet had a census to tell us how many women there are, what kind of talents they have, and how they can be most swiftly distributed into industry.

Mr. Lamb: There are large numbers of rural people who are underemployed at the present time who need to be transferred. Moreover, we need particularly to use these people within the plants at a much greater efficiency. This I think needs labor inspectors—utilization inspectors—to go into the plants and assist the management and perhaps to be assisted by labor-management committees.

Mr. Wolman: In this listing I don't want to omit what seems to me to be one of the most important unused sources of additional labor supply and manpower, and that is the prevailing hours which are worked in this country. This problem has been a subject of discussion and debate for some time. Statutes have been drawn up and bills have been introduced in Congress, and yet we've done nothing about it.

Mr. Wirth: It seems to me that the question as to whether labor should work longer hours ought to be determined only after we know what the need for labor is. Moreover, I think labor itself ought to have something to say about it.

Let me cite this instance which also comes from one of the congressional hearings. It points out that to date only fifteen hundred labor-management committees exist, even on paper, out of more than ten thousand war plants. Many of the largest firms have been actively hostile toward setting up such committees. I think we could get better production if labor and management have a joint voice in the production schedule.[9]

MR. WOLMAN: That might very well be so, but I should suggest that one of the first problems that these labor-management committees should take up is the problem of lengthening hours in the most effective and speedy way.

MR. WIRTH: I agree.

MR. LAMB: I would go further and say that the American people don't yet imagine the productive capacity which they have at hand in their own energies. The English have already discovered many of these things, but the English started off with great advantages over us. For example, they had occupational deferment from the very start.

Let me illustrate by a brief story to the effect that a lady from the nobility applied at the employment exchange, indicating that she thought she could probably do nothing better than pour tea at a canteen. That lady is now a bus conductor and has been working eight to ten hours a day for many months.

MR. WIRTH: One of the questions, it seems to me, that we've

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[9] ". . . . The British labor supply inspectors are many of them production engineers, while a large number also are drawn from trade-union ranks. Because of the shortness of time at our disposal, this country will probably need to rely to a large extent on labor-management committees for much of its knowledge regarding the progress of labor utilization in each war plant. In this connection, the War Production Board has not actively carried out its announced policies for setting up such committees. To date only 1,500 committees exist even on paper, out of more than 10,000 war plants, and some of the largest firms have been actively hostile toward setting up such committees. There are at present no manpower planning functions delegated to these committees" (*ibid.*).



* From *Monthly Labor Review*, July, 1942, and *Business Week*, September 12, 1942.

heard so much about in this country is whether people shall be compelled to work or compelled to fight. Is that really the alternative?

MR. LAMB: In England the basis for occupational deferment and the selective service is fundamentally different from ours. There it isn't a question of compelling a man to work at the job in which he finds himself but it is to place him in the job (whether it be in the army or in industry or agriculture) where his highest skill can be best used.[10]

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[10] "Those who cite the British experience to support their contention that a national service act should be passed at this time are misleading the American public. Such an act can work in England with a minimum of compulsion because the machinery already exists in the Ministry of Labour and National Service for centralizing decisions with respect to manpower mobilization for the armed services, the merchant marine, and the war production program. For instance, the selection of men for the armed services is made through the Ministry of Labour.

"Within this Ministry there also exists adequate regional and local machinery for determining the manpower requirements of war industry and transportation and for carrying out an adequate program for transfer, training, and upgrading of such war production workers. In the absence of comparable machinery in this country it is clear that the use of compulsory powers granted under a national service act would have very serious consequences to our war effort" (*ibid.*).

Mr. Wolman: That statement really raises a fundamental question in organization as well as in fact. What is the relation at the present time, and what relation should there be, in such reorganization as may take place, between the whole problem of occupational deferment and manpower, defining manpower to be the number of people required for civilian activities as well as for the armed forces.

Mr. Wirth: The question, in other words, is whether we should have a national service act.

Mr. Wolman: Yes.

Mr. Lamb: Of course, there are several of those already before the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Mr. Wirth: I don't think we can examine these acts and these specific proposals. What we ought to do is to examine the general policies along which we are to travel.

Mr. Wolman: I don't think that until we have collected the kind of information we've been asking for and had it properly and authoritatively interpreted can we commit ourselves with respect to the general question of how much compulsion we will need immediately, how much we will need in the larger future, and for what purposes.

Mr. Lamb: Of course, we already have a considerable degree of compulsion but not a coordinated form of use of those compulsions.

Mr. Wirth: That is, are you referring to our ceilings on income, the abandonment by labor of the right to strike, and the Selective Service System, which operates, as it does now, segmentally from the rest?

Mr. Lamb: That's correct. Many of these things that we've been describing interfere with one another in such a way as to make it practically impossible for them all to work well.

Mr. Wolman: Of course, one of the questions which no doubt

* The estimates are from the *Monthly Labor Review* for June, 1942. The figures are as of December, 1941. "War Industries" includes iron and steel and nonferrous metals, machinery, transportation, equipment, lumber, and chemicals.

will be settled, or on which a great deal of light would be thrown by a committee like the Baruch Committee dealing with this manpower problem, would be the question of how much compulsion we need.

MR. WIRTH: We already have some compulsion, also, on the dairy and poultry workers, haven't we? That is, they've been told that if they transfer to a new industry out of their old industry, they will no longer be deferred from selective service.

MR. LAMB: We also have it for the nonferrous metal miners. That case is a fine example of what is wrong, for, as a matter of fact,

four thousand of them are being taken out of the armed forces and returned to copper-mining.

MR. WOLMAN: We're beginning to have it in relation to the whole question of stealing labor from one indispensable plant or operation to another indispensable plant or occupation.

MR. LAMB: Doesn't all this add up to the fact not only that we need complete integration for the manpower mobilization but that we need some sort of over-all plan for our war effort?

MR. WOLMAN: It seems to me we've all arrived at the conclusion that we can't have a manpower policy unless we have a total war policy. The two are so closely connected that they both have to be considered and conceived together.

MR. WIRTH: I feel that if we're going to restrict labor, as we may feel it is necessary to do, and as Mr. Green, Mr. Murray, and the President have said it may be necessary to do—though not now—then, also, we have to assure labor and those whose freedom is restricted that the sacrifices will be equalized throughout the country and that no one is going to profit by these controls that are imposed upon labor.

MR. WOLMAN: I agree with that, and I'd like to extend that assurance to all elements of the population who are going to give up their incomes and their rights and their conveniences and their comforts.

MR. LAMB: In order to attain this, it seems to me that it would be fair to give the Tolan Committee's proposal for a War Mobilization Office to head up the entire present program a fair consideration.[11]

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[11] "The committee therefore proposes legislative action to establish an Office of War Mobilization to be headed by a director who will also serve as the chairman of a Board for War Mobilization and as the chairman of a committee on requirements and program. This office shall be a policy-determining agency, and to equip it for making such decisions there shall be transferred to it part or all of the existing planning and progress-reporting divisions of the agencies to

MR. WIRTH: We're agreed, then, that we must give the military the responsibility for stating what they need—the numbers for the Army and amount of supplies and when they need them—and the civilian authorities responsibility for deciding what needs to be done on the civilian and supply front.

We know that immediate improvements can be made in the situation as it now exists, and we've suggested some of them. Obviously, this subject is so complicated and so difficult that we can't go into the whole of it here. Many of the facts have had to be left out of our discussion. If an Office of War Mobilization, which the Tolan Committee recommends, is going to come into being, it may actually succeed in coordinating the effort.

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be subordinate to this office. It is proposed that three agencies shall be subordinate to the Office of War Mobilization, namely, a new Office of War Supply, an Office of War Manpower, and the Office of Economic Stabilization (*ibid.*).

Also attached to the Office of War Manpower would be a board for war mobilization, consisting of five representatives of industry, agriculture, and labor, which would advise and be consulted on "all major policies and exercise its efforts to achieve the maximum cooperation of the American people in economic mobilization."

The projected Office of War Manpower would be an operating agency superseding the War Manpower Commission, and the latter's policy-making powers would be subject to the control of the Office of War Manpower. The Tolan Committee's report proposes to divide selective service so that occupational deferment boards would be separately constituted and attached to the operating division of the suggested OWM. The local draft boards, however, would be operated under a continuation of the Selective Service Administration attached to the OWM and would dispose of all cases of undue hardship arising from the draft.

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The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on pages 24–26.

*

1. Is there a manpower shortage in your community? Is one expected? Are any efforts being made to meet the growing shortage of manpower? What do you think ought to be done in your local community to meet this problem?
2. What system of controls should be applied to manpower? Voluntary? Compulsory? Or what combination of these? Are the present manpower controls getting the job done? What evidence is there that new compulsory controls are needed? Discuss.
3. Is the War Manpower Commission or the Selective Service System adequate to deal with the manpower problem? Why is the Selective Service System unsuited for manpower mobilization according to the Tolan Committee reports? Should the War Manpower Commission be empowered by a national war service act to exercise complete compulsory control of manpower mobilization? Discuss.
4. Why is the manpower problem closely connected with the problems of the organization of the war-production program, the second front, and a unified command? What are the merits of the Tolan Committee's recommendation that an "Office of War Mobilization" be set up? Should a new central manpower agency be set up with full authority? Should the central manpower agency be run by the Army or by civilians?
5. The absence of compulsion requires incentives. What kind of incentives and voluntary controls might be effective in solving the problem of allocation of manpower?

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220. *Limiting Wartime Incomes*
221. *Education for Freedom*
222. *The United Nations*
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224. *The Near East*
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Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1470	Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240
Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Manchester, N.H.	WFEA	1370
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660
Baltimore, Md.	WBAL	1090	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Bluefield, W.Va.	WHIS	1440	Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060
Boston, Mass.	WNAC	1260	Pittsburgh, Pa.	KDKA	1020
Buffalo, N.Y.	WBEN	930	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1100	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Columbus, Ohio	WCOL	1230	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Dayton, Ohio	WING	1410	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	810
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	950	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1340
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1230	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Toledo, Ohio	WSPD	740
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930	Wilmington, Dela.	WDEL	1150
Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600
Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1340	Zanesville, Ohio	WHIZ	1240

1:30 P.M. CENTRAL WAR TIME

Amarillo, Texas	KGNC	1440	Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970
Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Madison, Wis.	WIBA	1310
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230
Bristol, Tenn.	WOPI	1490	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790
Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn.	KSTP	1500
Dallas, Texas	WFAA	820	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
Duluth, Minn., and Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1320	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
Eau Claire, Wis.	WEAU	1070	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
El Paso, Texas	KTSM	1380	Pittsburg, Kans.	KOAM	810
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WGL	1450	St. Louis, Mo.	KSD	550
Fort Worth, Texas	KGKO	570	San Antonio, Texas	WOAI	1200
Hattiesburg, Miss.	WFOR	1400	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Indianapolis, Ind.	WIRE	1430	Sioux Falls, S.D.	KSOO	1140
Jackson, Miss.	WJDX	1300	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1400	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
Laurel, Miss.	WAML	1340	Wichita, Kans.	KANS	1240
Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	920			

12:30 P.M. MOUNTAIN WAR TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	1030	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Billings, Mont.	KGHL	790	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	930
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1270
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Yuma, Ariz.	KYUM	1240
Helena, Mont	KPFA	1240			

11:30 A.M. PACIFIC WAR TIME

Bakersfield, Cal.	KERN	1410	Sacramento, Cal.	KFBK	1530
Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	San Diego, Cal.	KFSD	600
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
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